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1. Introduction 
The great flux of migrants and asylum seekers towards and across the European frontiers is one of the 
highest debated issues nowadays. The fear of an alien “invasion”, intolerance and xenophobia in Europe 
have all been amplified by the perceived economic stagnation and eventually exploited for far-right 
political parties’ agenda. Protective policies in matter of immigration have been adopted and border 
control has been intensified, especially in the most vulnerable frontiers like the Mediterranean and the 
Balkans routes. 
It is for this reason that European States engaged in cooperation with non-European countries 
considered “secure”, charging them with the responsibility of handling the migratory movements in 
exchange of financial and material support. While the declared intent is to stop human smuggling and 
trafficking and prevent transnational crimes, the concrete effect is that the number of migrants who 
manage to reach the European coasts has been considerably reduced. The adoption of this policy of 
“cooperation” resulted in the creation of makeshift camps in some countries of transit, where migrants 
live in precarious conditions. In the worse cases, they are constrained in internment camps for an 
undefined amount of time and are subject to any form of abuse and human right violations.  
                                                          
* Articolo sottoposto a referaggio. Si ringrazia il Prof. Andrea Crescenzi per avermi guidata e consigliata nella 
stesura di questo elaborato. Si ringraziano inoltre il Prof. Sergio Marchisio, direttore del Master in Protezione 
Internazionale dei Diritti Umani dell’Università Sapienza, e il Prof. Raffaele Cadin, docente presso il menzionato 
Master e collaboratore di federalismi. 
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The above considerations pose some sound doubts about the level of involvement, and therefore liability, 
of the European States. Supposedly, European States cannot be held responsible for such violations since 
those operations are totally external to their direct sphere of control. Nevertheless, the general impression 
is that theirs is just an attempt to escape legal responsibility for these breaches, in particular under the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) in virtue of alleged lack of jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the non-European countries. It may be held that a deliberate 
circumvention of human rights obligations is nevertheless capable of triggering responsibility under 
international law. 
The following paragraphs will analyse the obligations of European States under international law and the 
norms of the ECHR in respect to administrative detention of migrants. Then, an overview will be 
provided on the agreements between the European Union (EU) and its Member States (MS) and third 
countries, with a particular focus on the 2017 Italian-Libyan pact. In the last two sectors an attempt will 
be made to establish the possible profiles of responsibility of the MS of the EU for the actions perpetrated 
outside their territory, both under international law and under regional human rights law.  
For matters of simplicity, this contribution will focus primarily on refugees and asylum seekers, while 
issues relating to economic immigration will be left apart. However, since the recognition of the refugee 
status has a merely declarative nature, the principle of non-refoulement is applicable both to refugees and 
asylum seekers, even before the formal recognition of the status.1 In this respect it is impossible to make 
an a priori distinction among immigrants, at least until it is clear who has the intention to submit an 
application for asylum and who declares that he or she is migrating merely for economic purposes. It is 
also worth noticing that the principles discussed below entail to fundamental human rights that must be 
recognised to every person without discrimination, thus in abstract they are applicable to all cases. 
 
2. Administrative detention of asylum seekers in Europe 
Seeking asylum is a universal human right. Under current international law, individuals have no right to 
be granted asylum vis-à-vis the State of refuge, which maintains a margin of appreciation on the conditions 
for recognition of the status of refugee.2 However, in the words of Article 14 of the Universal Declaration 
                                                          
1 F. ZORZI GIUSTINIANI, Divieto di Non-Refoulement e Tortura. Osservazioni in Margine al General Comment n. 4 alla 
Convenzione ONU Contro la Tortura e Altre Pene o Trattamenti Crudeli, Inumani o Degradanti del 1984, in Federalismi - Focus 
Human Rights, 29 October 2018, p. 4. 
UNHCR, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, 26 January 2007. 
2 Inter alia, R. BOED, The State of The Right of Asylum in International Law, in Duke Journal of Comparative & International 
Law, Vol. 51, 1994, pp. 8-14; F. RESCIGNO, Il Diritto di Asilo, Roma, 2011, pp. 33-35; M. UDINA, L’asilo politico 
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of Human Rights (UDHR), “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution”.3 This means that individuals have a subjective right to leave their country of origin in order 
to ask for asylum elsewhere and States hold a correspondent duty to allow access to the country with the 
view of requesting protection. From this right-duty dichotomy derives the principle of non-
penalisation, according to which the unauthorised immigration of asylum seekers should not be 
considered a criminal offence by the country of entry nor should be subject to sanctions or criminal 
penalties.4 In the due balance between individual and public interests, it is generally agreed upon that 
criminalisation of irregular migration always exceeds the legitimate interest of States to protect their 
territories and it is therefore unproportionate.5 As a consequence, migrants seeking for asylum should 
not be treated as criminals even if they enter the State’s territory irregularly and without previous 
authorisation.  
Nonetheless, the contemporary political view is that the of necessity of effective borders’ control prevails 
over the right to personal freedom,6 and detention of asylum seekers in the form of “administrative 
detention” has become a key strategy in the management of migratory flows. Under a number of national 
legislations migrants can be deprived of liberty on several grounds, such as unauthorised entry, irregular 
residence (which happens e.g. when the authorisation or permit to stay has expired), when a deportation 
or expulsion decree is issued. Political agents even consider necessary and legitimate the deprivation of 
liberty while the request for asylum has been submitted and is under scrutiny. This normalisation of 
detention creates a double legal standard: while European citizens enjoy a large freedom of movement 
                                                          
territoriale nel diritto internazionale e secondo la Costituzione italiana, in Diritto Internazionale, Y. XXI n. 3, 1967, pp. 261-
262. 
3 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), Article 14. 
See also Article 22, in particular comma 7, of the San José Declaration on Refugees and Displaced Persons, adopted by the 
International Colloquium in Commemoration of the "Tenth Anniversary of the Cartagena Declaration on 
Refugees", San José, 5-7 December 1994. 
4 “The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who 
… enter or are present in their territory without authorization” (UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, Article 31). 
5 “Seeking asylum is a universal human right, the exercise of which must not be criminalized. The irregular entry 
and stay in a country by migrants should not be treated as a criminal offence, and the criminalization of irregular 
migration will therefore always exceed the legitimate interests of States in protecting their territories and regulating 
irregular migration flows. Migrants must not be qualified or treated as criminals or viewed only from the 
perspective of national or public security and/or health.” (UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Revised 
Deliberation No. 5 on deprivation of liberty of migrants, Adopted on 23 November 2017 and Revised on 7 February 2018, 
paras. 9 and 10). 
6 O. LOPEZ CRUZ, Administrative detention of migrants in Europe and the danger of a double standard in the protection of 
personal liberties, in Open Migration, 8 June 2016. 
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and which only be limited if they are charged with a criminal offence or they pose a grave threat to public 
order and safety, migrants can be detained for mere administrative purposes.7 
As said, this kind of imprisonment is usually deemed to be administrative in nature, and therefore the 
prohibition of criminalisation of irregular entry under international law is not directly violated. 
Nonetheless, often this practice has punitive effects and recipients perceive it as a criminal punishment. 
Not only it is highly discriminatory, but it is also likely to pose serious human rights concerns about the 
actual condition of detention. Even if detaining migrants in entry points or in reception, accommodation 
and relocation centres is usually considered legitimate under national legislations, it can be unlawful 
depending on factors such as the intensity, the length, the nature or the conditions of such detention.8 
 
3. Lawfulness and unlawfulness of detention: principle of legality, prohibition of arbitrary 
detention and the standard of human treatment  
International law and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) provide for a first set of rules that can be 
helpful in placing the line between lawful and unlawful detention. Article 9.1 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) designs the human right to liberty and security and 
affirms the principle of legality in matter of deprivation of liberty as well as the prohibition of arbitrary 
detention.9 
The principle of  legality aims at providing predictability and legal certainty of  the penalty and requires 
that the procedure as well as the substantive reasons of  detention are governed by a legal act which is 
accessible to the public and sufficiently concrete to guide individual conduct.10 
The prohibition of arbitrary detention is considered an absolute, non-derogable norm of customary 
international law (jus cogens),11 under which arrest or detention must not be discriminatory nor manifestly 
                                                          
7 Political view on the matter is that the mere lack of authorisation for presence on a national territory constitutes 
a legitimate ground for the use of ‘State violence’ (G. CORNELISSE, Immigration Detention and Human Rights: 
Rethinking Territorial Sovereignty, Leiden, 2010, p. 4). 
8 Y. KTISTAKIS, Protecting Migrants Under the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Social Charter, 
Strasbourg, February 2013, p. 23. 
9 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 999, p. 171: “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance 
with such procedure as are established by law”. 
10 N. PETERSEN, Liberty, Right to, International Protection, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
[MPEPIL], October 2012. 
11 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment No. 35, 16 December 2014, CCPR/C/GC/35, para. 66. 
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disproportionate.12 The Human Rights Committee (HRC) of the United Nations (UN) has interpreted 
Article 9.1 of the ICCPR as requiring that any measure imposing a restriction on the right to liberty “must 
be justified as reasonable, necessary and proportionate in light of the circumstances”.13 Pursuant to the 
UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, deprivation of liberty must be regarded as arbitrary, inter 
alia, “[w]hen asylum seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged administrative custody 
without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or remedy”.14 
At the regional level, the ECHR provides for an additional legal framework for European States to 
comply with in order to avoid infringing their obligations under IHRL in matter of detention. Article 5, 
paragraph 1 of the ECHR sets forth a peremptory list of circumstances under which restriction to liberty 
is allowed, mainly linked to the criminal responsibility of the detainee. Under the terms of letter f) of the 
same article, “the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry 
into the country…” is permitted. This provision seems to create a friction with the abovementioned 
principle of non-criminalisation and the general principle of non-refoulement and it has been invoked by 
European States to justify their policy of taking immigrants into custody.15 However, it can be argued 
that the ECtHR has implicitly stipulated that this provision shall not be referred to in cases of detention 
of asylum seekers.16  
In addition, the following paragraphs of Article 5 ECHR offer a catalogue of rights to be granted in case 
of restrictions on liberty and the case law of the ECtHR developed a range of limitations to the possibility 
of resort to confinement, particularly in relation to migrants.17Accordingly, detention must be compatible 
                                                          
12 HRC, van Alphen v. the Netherlands (Communication No. 305/1988), CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988, 23 July 1990. 
See also N. PETERSEN, Liberty, Right to, International Protection, 2012, cit. note 10. According to him, arbitrariness 
has a broader sense than illegality and covers certain substantive criteria, such as elements of injustice, 
unreasonableness, capriciousness, and disproportionality. 
13 HRC, General Comment No.35, cit. note 11, para. 18. 
14 UN Human Rights Council Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinions adopted by the Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention at its 68th session, 13–22 November 2013, A/HRC/WGAD/2013/, p. 2. 
15 If this provision, one the one hand, seems in contrast with the general prohibition to criminalise illegal entry, on 
the other hand, it seems to exclude lawfulness of detention of asylum seekers, once the request has been advanced, 
and therefore it cannot be used by States as a justification for detention of people while their request of asylum is 
pending.  
16 European Law Institute (ELI), Statement of the European Law Institute: Detention of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants 
and the Rule of Law, 2017, pp. 40-41. For example, ECtHR, S.D. v. Greece, Application no. 53541/07, Judgement of 
11 June 2009, para. 62; ECtHR, Ahmade v. Greece, Application no. 50520/09, Judgement of 25 September 2012, 
paras. 139, 143; ECtHR, R.U. v. Greece, Application no. 2237/08, Judgement of 7 June 2011, paras. 94-95. 
17 ECtHR Press Release, Factsheet – Migrants in detention, April 2018 
(available at www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Migrants_detention_ENG.pdf, accessed on 13 November 2018).  
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with the overall purpose of Article 5, which is safeguarding the right to liberty and ensuring no one to be 
dispossessed of his or her liberty in an arbitrary fashion. Therefore, deprivation of liberty shall not be 
arbitrary, automatic nor collective; on the contrary, it should be exceptional, proportionate and strictly 
necessary. It should only be a measure of last resort, applied only after a careful examination of the 
individual circumstances on a case by case basis, and alternative, non-custodial measures should be 
employed wherever possible. Lastly, it should be subject to periodic review. Whenever a State fails to 
comply with these standards, a breach of Article 5 ECHR occurs.  
Inappropriateness of places of detention combined with long deprivation of liberty may also violate the 
prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 ECHR.18 European 
States are required to comply with the principles of strict necessity, proportionality and legality, as 
established also under Article 5; in addition, they must grant access to remedies, access to healthcare, 
adequate and decent living conditions, special care for vulnerable people and the respect of other basic 
human rights.19 The prolonged detention itself in absence of a time limit and with unclear prospects for 
release, could easily be considered as amounting to inhuman treatment under Article 3 ECHR, even 
without any further consideration on material conditions of detention.20 
ECtHR jurisprudence has been consistent in condemning States for migrants’ imprisonment on the basis 
of violations of Articles 5 and 3 ECHR.21 The Court notably applies also other IHRL instruments in its 
decisions, the most prominent being the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 
which is a bounding treaty for all European States and introduced the principle of non-refoulement 
under its Article 31.22  
In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the ECtHR held that “the confinement of aliens, accompanied by suitable 
safeguards for the persons concerned, is acceptable only in order to enable States to prevent unlawful 
immigration while complying with their international obligations, in particular under the 1951 Geneva 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the ECHR. States’ legitimate concern to foil the 
increasingly frequent attempts to circumvent immigration restrictions must not deprive asylum seekers 
of the protection afforded by these conventions… The States must have particular regard to Article 3 of 
                                                          
18 Y. KTISTAKIS, Protecting Migrants, 2013, cit. note 8, p. 34. 
19 European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CPT), Factsheet on Immigration Detention, March 2017, CPT/Inf(2017)3 (available at www.rm.coe.int/16806fbf12, 
accessed on 13 November 2018).  
20 Ibid. p. 2. 
21 ECtHR, Factsheet – Migrants in detention, 2018, cit. note 17. In particular, ECtHR GC, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy - 
holding of irregular migrants on Lampedusa and Palermo, Application no. 406/2016, Judgement of 15 December 2016. 
22 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, cit. note 4. 
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the Convention, which enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies and 
prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment irrespective of 
the circumstances and of the victim’s conduct”.23 
Lastly, European States’ obligations in the light of human rights standards may arise also under internal 
constitutional and statutory provisions as well as under the law of the EU. The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of The European Union establishes at its Article 6 the right to liberty and security, which must be 
read in combination with the procedural rights of Articles 47 (right to a fair trial and effective remedy) 
and 49 (principle of legality) of the Charter.24 Specific requirements for reception and accommodation 
are set out also in some ad hoc Regulations and Directives of the EU, giving indications on the standards 
MS must comply with in order to ensure respect for human dignity.25 Importantly, in accordance with 
the principle of non-refoulement, Article 4 of Frontex Regulation 656/201426 provides that no person shall 
be disembarked in, forced to enter, conducted to or otherwise handed over to the authorities of a country 
where his or her life can be put at risk, where he or she can be persecuted, and “from which there is a 
serious risk of an expulsion, removal or extradition to another country in contravention of the principle 
of non-refoulement”. Not only EU secondary laws with an impact on human rights are significant under the 
jurisdictional authority of national courts and of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), but they may have 
further consequences for the responsibility of a contracting State to respect human rights contained in 
                                                          
23 ECtHR GC, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application no. 30696/09, Judgement 21 January 2011, paras. 216-218. 
 24 European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of The European Union (Nice Charter), 18 December 2000, 2000/C 
364/01. 
25 E.g. Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), 29 June 2013, 
OJ L. 180/31-180/59; 29.6.2013, (EU)No 604/2013; Council of the European Union, Directive 2011/95/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless 
persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and 
for the content of the protection granted (recast), 20 December 2011, OJ L. 337/9-337/26; 20.12.2011, 2011/95/EU; 
Council of the European Union, Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and Council of 26 June 2013 laying 
down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast), 29 June 2013, OJ L. 180/96 -105/32; 
29.6.2013, 2013/33/EU; Council of the European Union, Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast), 29 June 2013, OJ 
L. 180/60 -180/95; 29.6.2013, 2013/32/EU. 
For and extensive overview on European Law on detention in matter of asylum, European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, Handbook on European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration, 2015, pp. 141-169. 
26 Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 
2014 establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union, 24 June 2014, OJ L. 189/93, 27.6.2014, p. 93–107, 2014/656/EU. 
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the ECHR.27 In the already mentioned M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, the legal obligations under the 
Reception Directive were recognised by the ECtHR as a decisive factor for the establishment of a level 
of protection of human dignity of an asylum seeker against degrading treatment and living conditions 
during detention.28 
Hence, the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, the forbiddance of arbitrary 
detention, the principle of non-refoulement and the right to seek asylum must be read in combination as 
an intersection of rights that imposes a duty for States to avoid violations. In other words, in order to 
grant the full enjoyment of the right to seek asylum, States must apply the principle of non-refoulement 
and make sure they do not repulse, expel or extradite migrants in countries where their rights are at stake, 
particularly in relation to the right to be free from torture and from arbitrary detention. 
 
4. From internal administrative detention to external border control. The Libyan case 
As a response to the many condemnations by the ECtHR, European States are making efforts to preserve 
a surface of compliance with the human rights standards contained in the ECHR, in the 1951 Geneva 
Convention and in all the other relevant human rights instruments imposing obligations upon States to 
respect basic human rights of refuge seekers. One of the strategies to circumvent the risk to be sentenced 
by the ECtHR for breaches of IHRL is typically the adoption by the MS of the EU of the policy of 
externalizing migration control and the consequent externalization of the responsibility for violations 
of human rights. This practice consists in outsourcing border control to third neighbour countries, 
delegating to them the administration of migratory fluxes and then shifting the duty to protect to States 
outside the EU.29 It has been noted that those States that would have been able to avail themselves of 
asylum procedures, social support, and decent reception conditions relegate responsibility to countries 
of first arrival or transit that have comparatively less capacity to ensure protection of human rights in accordance 
with international standards.30 
As an example, one alternative to inter-State detention facilities has been the creation of detention camps 
in border areas, the s.c. “transit zones” (e.g. what happened in the edge territory between Hungary and 
Serbia). States concerned have repeatedly argued that migrants kept in transit zones are not deprived of 
                                                          
27 ELI, Detention of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants and the Rule of Law, 2017, cit. note 16, p. 40. 
28 ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 2011, cit. note 23, paras. 231, 233, 250, 263. 
29 J. BAST, F. V. HARBOU, J. WESSELS, Human Rights Challenges to European Migration Policy (REMAP) Discussion 
paper, in Forschungsgruppe Migration & Menschenrechte, August 2018, pp. 2-3. 
30 B. FRELICK - I. M. KYSEL - J. PODKUL, The Impact of Externalization of Migration Controls on the Rights of Asylum 
Seekers and Other Migrants, in Journal on Migration and Human Security, Vol. IV, No. 4, 2016, pp. 190-220. 
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their liberty because they are free to leave, and anyway the States consider themselves exonerated from 
responsibility because people are not properly on their territory yet.31 Nevertheless, the inhuman and 
degrading conditions of migrants in such areas, combined with the lack of any basic guarantee as access 
to justice and remedies or to decent facilities, has once again proved these States de facto responsible for 
human rights infringements.32 
Outside Europe, an eminent example of discharge of accountability with regard to immigration control 
is the Australian model,33 under which all asylum seekers arriving in Australia by boat are intercepted and 
transported to detention centres in the Pacific island States of Nauru and Papua New Guinea, financed 
by the Australian government, allegedly for health and security assessments. Even if migrants are found 
to have the right to be accorded the status of refugee, they never have the chance to be permanently 
resettled in Australia, unless they are minors. This controversial policy is justified as a means of reducing 
the number of casualties at sea and combat human trafficking, but it clearly breaches Australia’s 
international obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention, notably the mentioned principles of non-
refoulement and non-penalization for irregular entry. 
European States have started to apply this model in their foreign policies concerning migrants and asylum 
seekers, involving third countries into the EU’s migration control. Since the 2004 with the Hague 
Program, the EU has increasingly “externalized” its borders, especially through remote control policies 
and entering into immigration agreements with third countries. In February 2009, the Italian and Libyan 
Governments signed a Technical Protocol establishing an agreement providing for the push-backs of 
refugees to North Africa. The Protocol was suspended in 2012 following the landmark ECtHR’s Hirsi 
Jamaa v. Italy case34 where the Court found Italy responsible for violations of Articles 3 (prohibition of 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment) and 13 (nulla poena sine lege) of the Convention as well as 
Article 4 of Protocol 4 (prohibition of collective expulsion).35 Nonetheless, this practice has revitalised in 
recent years with new pacts with extra-European countries deemed to be “safe and secure”, most notably 
                                                          
31 G. CORNELISSE, Immigration Detention and Human Rights, 2010, cit. note 7, pp. 6-7. 
32 For example, it is still pending under the scrutiny of the ECtHR the case Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary on the 
conditions and duration of detention in border-zones (ECtHR, Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, Application no. 
47287/15, pending). 
33 The “Pacific Solution” (2001-2008) and “Operation Sovereign Borders” (since 2013). 
For an in-depth analysis, B. FRELICK - I. M. KYSEL - J. PODKUL, The Impact of Externalization of Migration 
Controls on the Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other Migrants, 2016, cit. note 30, pp. 203-206.  
34 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa et al. v. Italy, Application no. 27765/09, Judgment of 23 February 2012. 
35 Council of Europe, Protocol N. 4 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, securing 
certain rights and freedoms other than those already in the Convention and in the First Protocol thereto, as amended by Protocol N. 
11, Strasbourg, 16.IX.1963. 
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with the EU-Turkey Pact of February 201636 and, more importantly, the 2017 Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) between the Italian and the new Libyan governments.  
 
4.1. The Italian-Libyan MoU on immigration control: a focus 
The aim of the agreement was to “combat illegal immigration, human trafficking and contraband and 
[…] reinforc[e] the border security between the Libya State and the Italian Republic”.37 Libya would host 
the migrants temporarily in camps until they return to their countries of origin and Italy would train 
personnel working in the hosting centers.38 In addition, relying on funds made available by the EU, Italy 
committed to provide technical and economic support to Libyan bodies and institutions in charge of the 
fight against “illegal immigration” (Article 1 of the MoU). It is also worth noting that after few days from 
the MoU with Libya, Italy has signed another similar framework agreement with Tunisia which, while 
more stable than Libya, still is a fragile State with weak government institutions, whose law criminalises 
irregular entry, stay, and exit and lacks any adequate protection for refugees.39 The UN Committee 
Against Torture expressed concerns that the agreement did not contain any particular provision that may 
render cooperation and support conditional on respect of human rights,40 and the MoU was successfully 
challenged by a group of Libyan human rights defenders in the Libyan Supreme Court, which suspended 
its application on technical grounds in March 2017. However, despite this decision, Italy has assisted in 
the maintenance of Libyan Coast Guard vessels and provided technical support and training. 
The next day after the signing of the MoU with Libya, on February 3rd 2017, the European Council 
adopted the Malta Declaration,41 encouraging individual MS to directly engage with Libya for border 
                                                          
36 European Council, EU-Turkey Statement, Press release, 144/16, 18 March 2016. 
37 Italian-Libyan MoU on cooperation in the development sector, to combat illegal immigration, human trafficking and contraband 
and on reinforcing the border security, 3 February 2017. 
38 Article 2.3 and Preamble of the MoU: “The Parties commit to undertake actions in … adaptation and financing 
of the above-mentioned reception centres already active compliance with the relevant provisions, making recourse 
to funds made available by Italy and the European Union. The Italian party contributes, through the delivery of 
medicines and medical equipment, to the improvement of the illegal immigrants’ medical needs in the centres, in 
the treatment of communicable and serious chronic diseases … training of the Libyan personnel within the above 
mentioned reception centres to face the illegal immigrants’ conditions, supporting the Libyan research centres 
operating in this field so that they can contribute to the identification of the most adequate methods to face the 
clandestine immigration phenomenon and human trafficking”. 
39 M. G. GIUFFRE, From Turkey to Libya: The EU Migration Partnership from Bad to Worse, in Eurojust, 20 March 2017. 
40 CAT, Concluding observations on the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Italy, CAT/C/ITA/CO/5-6, December 
2017, para. 22. 
41 Council of the European Union, Malta Declaration by the members of the European Council on the external aspects of 
migration: addressing the Central Mediterranean route, 3 February 2017. 
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management and welcoming the MoU. The purposes of the MoU and the Malta Declaration were 
confirmed during the Paris meeting of the Heads of State and Government of France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Niger, Chad, and the 
Chairman of the Presidential Council of Libya.42 In a Joint Statement on ‘Addressing the Challenge of 
Migration’ of 28 August 2017, they agreed to pursue the return of irregular migrants to the countries of 
origin, in particular to Niger and Chad, and welcomed “the Italian project to cooperate with 14 
communities along migration routes in Libya”.43  
Apparently, no concerns at the European level have been posed about the fact that Libya, a State which 
is not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and has no domestic law or procedure for considering asylum 
claims, regularly perpetrates gross violations of human rights. Migrants reaching Libya without valid entry 
documents are forcibly placed in detention camps, where are usually subject to torture, harassment, 
violence, sexual exploitation and forced labour. The conditions in the detention centers have been 
extensively described by Reports from international organisations, European institutions and NGOs, all 
of which acknowledge the gross human rights violations and extreme abuse of detainees, including sexual 
violence, slavery, forced prostitution, torture, maltreatment, human smuggling and trafficking of migrants 
for organs, lack of judicial review, poor sanitary conditions.44 
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights of the United Nations (OHCHR) reported that 
migrants in Libya are “vulnerable to unlawful killings, torture and other ill-treatment, arbitrary detention 
and unlawful deprivation of liberty, rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, slavery 
and forced labour, extortion and exploitation by both State and non-State actors”.45 Malnutrition, 
starvation, gang-rape, use of lethal force and extrajudicial executions, deaths in captivity, arbitrary and 
                                                          
42 A. SKORDAS, A ‘Blind Spot’ in the Migration Debate? International Responsibility of  the EU and its Member States for 
Cooperating with the Libyan Coastguard and Militias, in EU Migration Law Blog, 30 January 2018 (available at 
www.eumigrationlawblog.eu/a-blind-spot-in-the-migration-debate-international-responsibility-of-the-eu-and-its-
member-states-for-cooperating-with-the-libyan-coastguard-and-militias/, accessed on 13 November 2018). 
43 Joint Statement: Addressing the Challenge of Migration and Asylum, Paris, 28 August 2017. 
44 Amnesty International, Libya’s Dark Web Of Collusion: Abuses Against Europe-Bound Refugees And Migrants, 11 
December 2017; A. SKORDAS, Violations of Human Rights of Migrants in Libya, University of Copenhagen, 1 
February 2018; Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in 
Libya, and the Effectiveness of Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building Measures Received by the Government of Libya, 
21February 2018; European External Action Service, EUBAM Libya Initial Mapping Report Executive Summary 
(EEAS(2017) 0109), 25 January 2017; Human Rights Watch, World Report 2018, Libya – Events of 2017, January 
2018; Global Detention Project, Country Detention Reports, Immigration Detention in Libya: “A Human Rights Crisis”, 
30 August 2018. 
45 OHCHR, Support Mission in Libya, Desperate and Dangerous: Report on the human rights situation of migrants and refugees 
in Libya, 20 December 2018, Executive summary.  
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indefinite detention, torture, smuggling and trafficking, including of children, are also reported, and there 
are “credible information on the complicity of some State actors, including local officials, members of 
armed groups formally integrated into State institutions, and representatives of the Ministry of Interior 
and Ministry of Defence”. The OHCHR portraits the “climate of lawlessness” and describes Libyan 
authorities, including the judiciary, as weak institutions that are “unable, if not unwilling, to address the 
plethora of abuses and violations committed against migrants and refugees by smugglers, traffickers, 
members of armed groups and State officials, with near total impunity”. 
Furthermore, the same national Courts are starting to acknowledge the grave human rights breaches 
committed in Libya, uncovering the brutal, cruel and inhuman treatment migrants are exposed to in the 
Libyan detention camps. A landmark example is the Sentence n. 10/2017 of the Assize Court of Milan, 
in which the judges and the popular jury sentenced the accused, a 24 year old Somalian, to life 
imprisonment for a series of crimes perpetrated in Libya, notably: kidnapping and abduction of some 
hundreds of victims, aggravated by the death of some of the victims due to the poor conditions of 
detention and the abuses endured; facilitation of human smuggling and human trafficking, aggravated by 
the factor of being part of an international criminal organisation; aggravated violence and sexual assault, 
also towards minors.46 This case illustrates that sometimes the action of the judiciary compensates for the 
aberrations of the executive power and shows that States and people cannot turn a blind eye on the 
Libyan humanitarian disaster anymore. 
 
5. The problem with externalised responsibility 
European States regard the delegation of borders control to third countries as a sort of ‘safe harbour’ to 
limit immigration and the consequent obligation to grant decent reception standards compliant with their 
human right duties under international law, and consequently to avoid accountability for such breaches 
externalising the responsibility. However, MS’ obligations under international, European refugee law and 
IHRL do not stop at the territorial boundaries of the EU. 
 
5.1. International human rights instruments and Extraterritorial Responsibility 
MS can be held accountable under a number of international human rights instruments for actions 
executed outside their boundaries. For instance, the ICCPR,47 the Convention Against Torture (CAT),48 
                                                          
46 Assize Court of Milan, I Section, sent. 10/2017, 10 October 2017.  
47 Human Rights Committee (HRC), Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, 29 July 1981. 
48 UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 
December 1984, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85. 
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the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,49 the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 
same ECHR,50 all refer to “jurisdiction” rather than “territory” in order to determine the limit of State 
responsibility. Whenever a State exercises its extraterritorial jurisdiction – understood as control over 
actions taking place on another State’s territory – to control or prevent migration, such State is still bound 
by the relevant provisions of IHRL, IHL and International Criminal Law (ICL), even when the actions 
are materially carried out by a third party. 
In fact, it is uncontroversial that responsibility may arise either by act or omission, since in some cases, 
the failure to act can constitute a breach of an international obligation.51 To be legally significant an 
omission must be more than simple inaction, since it requires the existence of an unfulfilled legal duty to 
act.52 Although there is no general duty to prevent, there is a growing list of treaties, Security Council 
resolutions and judicial decisions where a specific duty to act is articulated or a particular due diligence in 
external actions is required. This way the prohibitions of torture and of arbitrary detention conducted by 
third party can be applied to the extra-territorial violation of principle of non-refoulement. 
For example, under the CAT a duty is imposed upon States to actively take effective measures to prevent 
torture and other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,53 and according to Article 
11 CAT States must have a particular diligence in case of detention and “shall keep under systematic 
review interrogation rules, instructions, methods and practices as well as arrangements for the custody 
and treatment of persons subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment in any territory 
under its jurisdiction, with a view to preventing any cases of torture”. This “responsibility to prevent” 
goes far beyond the territorial borders of the State. First, it is worth noticing that the forbiddance of 
torture is a norm of jus cogens valid erga omnes and enjoys universal jurisdiction per se. Second, Article 5 of 
the CAT extends the applicability of the Convention to “any territory under [the MS’s] jurisdiction” (as 
well as to other cases of connection between the State and the offence i.e. actions committed on a ship 
or aircraft registered in that State, when there is national link with the alleged offenders or the victims or 
                                                          
49 UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 
1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, p. 195. 
50 ECHR, Article 1 (infra).  
51 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 
2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, Article 2: 
“There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) Is 
attributable to the State under international law; and (b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the 
State”. 
52 J. CRAWFORD, State Responsibility: The General Part, Cambridge, 2013, p. 218. 
53 CAT, respectively Articles 2 and 16.  
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simply when the alleged offender is present in the State’s territory), thus implying a notion of 
“jurisdiction” broader than the territorial delimitation. Lastly, the Committee Against Torture 
corroborated this interpretation in the Marine I case ruling that “the jurisdiction of a State party refers to 
any territory in which it exercises, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, de jure or de facto effective 
control”,54 confirming its previous statement in General Comment No. 2 that “the concept of ‘any 
territory under its jurisdiction’, linked as it is with the principle of non-derogability, includes any territory 
or facilities and must be applied to protect any person, citizen or non-citizen without discrimination 
subject to the de jure or de facto control of a State party.”55 
Analogously, also the obligation of non-refoulement arises when a refugee is under its effective or de facto 
jurisdiction outside a State’s territory; this, to some extent, includes jurisdiction in international waters as 
well as in the territorial waters and the territory of another State.56 The Torture Committee further 
confirmed the extraterritorial application of the principle of non-refoulement in its recent General 
Comment No. 4: “Each State party must apply the principle of non-refoulement in any territory under 
its jurisdiction or any area under its control or authority”.57 It is interesting to note that the wording of 
the General Comment No. 4 marks a distinction between “control” and “authority”, where the latter 
appears to be a weaker type of power which still does not absolve from responsibility. Importantly the 
Committee specifically includes also the threat of acts of torture by non-State actors, when the group has 
a de facto control comparable to the State’s power,58 in the scope of the ban of refoulement, and prevents 
States “from deporting individuals to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that 
they would be in danger of being subjected to torture or other ill-treatment at the hands of non-State 
entities”.59 The Committee even affirms that “Since the failure of the State to exercise due diligence to 
intervene to stop, sanction and provide remedies to victims of torture facilitates and enables non-State 
actors to commit acts impermissible under the Convention with impunity, the State’s indifference or 
                                                          
54 UN Committee Against Torture (CAT), J.H.A. v. Spain (Marine I case), CAT/C/41/D/323/2007, 21 November 
2008, para. 8.2.  
55 UN Committee Against Torture (CAT), General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties, 24 
January 2008, CAT/C/GC/2, para. 7. 
56 B. VANDVIK, Extraterritorial Border Controls and Responsibility To Protect: A View from ECRE, in Amsterdam Law 
Forum, Vol. 1, No. 1, September 2008. 
57 UN Committee Against Torture (CAT), General Comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention 
in the context of article 22, 9 February 2018, para. 10. 
58 Committee Against Torture (CAT), Sadiq Shek Elmi v. Australia, CAT/C/22/D/120/1998, UN 25 May 1999, 
para. 6.5. 
59 CAT, General Comment No. 4, cit. note 55, par. 30. 
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inaction provides a form of encouragement and/or de facto permission”,60 thus introducing the positive 
duty upon States to actively impede actions of torture if they do not want to be held accountable for 
actions committed by a third party. 
Lastly, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention clarified that the prohibition of  arbitrary detention is 
an absolute, non-derogable norm of  customary international law that “can never be justified, including 
for any reason related to national emergency, maintaining public service, public security or the large 
movements of  immigrants or asylum seekers”, and above all this prohibition “extends both to the 
territorial jurisdiction and effective control of  a State”.61 
In conclusion, it is undeniable that current IHRL is developing a practice on extraterritorial State 
responsibility, but the issue arises whether the concept of “jurisdiction” may extend to extra-territorial 
actions when the oversea territory is not subject to direct control of the State (in our case, the EU and its 
MS) and the perpetrators are not nationals of such State, but nonetheless there is a functional link 
between the State and the violations.  
 
5.2. Theories of State responsibility under International Law 
As a general rule, under international customary law a State can be held responsible for a breach of 
international law (including IHRL, IHL and ICL), when it commits, gives instructions, exercises direction 
or control or provides aid or assistance over the commission of an internationally wrongful act by another 
State.62 
Article 1 of the 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts by the 
International Law Commission (ILC) stresses that “Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails 
the international responsibility of that State”. The problem arises on how to ascribe a conduct to a State 
(problem of attribution). The direct responsibility of States is enshrined in Article 4 of the Draft Articles 
and relates to the actions of the State organs and representatives (“de jure organ test”).63 As a subsidiary 
                                                          
60 CAT, General Comment No. 2, cit. note 52, par. 18.   
61 Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Revised Deliberation No. 5, 2018, cit. note 5, para. 8. 
62 ILC, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 2001, cit. note 41. 
63 The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the 
organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization 
of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State. 
An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State”. 
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test, Article 8 entails State responsibility for actions “in fact” carried out under the State’s instructions, 
direction or control (“de facto organ test”).64 
The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) helps to determine the scope of State 
responsibility beyond the letter of the Draft Articles and contributes to the definition of the “control” 
involving acts of non-State entities. This applies to the indirect attribution of acts of irregular groups, 
individuals or entities that are not formally part of the State but still act under its direction, control, 
instructions or influence. Since the concept of “instructions” refer to situations where State organs 
supplement their own action by recruiting or instigating private persons or groups who act as auxiliaries 
outside of the official State structure,65 it can be linked to the current situation in Libya where informal 
groups are empowered of functions that usually fall under the governmental prerogatives, such as the 
cooperation with European States and the direct management of detention facilities.  
The ICJ has identified the necessary threshold of State control over non-State actors to ascertain a State’s 
responsibility in the 1986 Nicaragua case and the following paramount decisions on the 2005 Armed 
Activities case66 and the 2007 Bosnian Genocide case.67 The standard reflects the so called “doctrine of 
effective control”, which requires evidence of specific conduct over operations. In the Nicaragua case,68 
the Court stated that when the relationship between a State and a non-State actor comprises dependence 
on the one side and control on the other, the latter should be equated with a de facto State organ acting 
on behalf of that Government, even though it does not enjoy that status under internal law; all the actions 
performed in such capacity would be attributable to the State for purposes of international 
responsibility.69 The Court proceeded delimitating the application of the effective control doctrine, 
clarifying that the responsibility of a State arises if it is proved that it had itself “directed or enforced the 
perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law”.70 Although the issues before 
the Court were framed in the context of IHL, the ICJ’s wording suggested a general application. To prove 
                                                          
64 “The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the 
person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State 
in carrying out the conduct”. 
65 J. CRAWFORD, State Responsibility, 2013, cit. note 50, p. 145. 
66 ICJ, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda); 
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Judgment of 1 July 2000. 
67 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, I.C.J. Reports 2007. 
68 ICJ, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Judgment of 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 62-64. 
69 Id., para. 109. 
70 Id., para. 115.  
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effective control, the claimant must show direct interference, such as financial assistance, military 
assistance, intelligence sharing, selection, support and supervision of the leadership.71 However, the 
control must be not only over the entities as such, but also over the activities or operations giving rise to 
the internationally wrongful act.72 This standard goes beyond equipping and financing a group and 
involves participation in the planning and supervision of the operations as well.73 
This quite strict interpretation of the “control” required by Article 8 finds a more lenient application in 
the 1999 Tadić case by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY),74 which introduced the 
“doctrine of overall control”. In that case the ICTY did not follow the jurisprudence of the Court in 
the Nicaragua case. On the contrary, the Court held that the appropriate criterion was that of the “overall 
control” (applicable in its view both to the characterization of the armed conflict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as international, and to impute the acts committed by Bosnian Serbs to the Former Republic 
of Yugoslavia under the law of State responsibility). In other words, the Appeals Chamber took the view 
that acts committed by a non-State entity could give rise to international responsibility of the State on 
the basis of the overall control exercised by the latter over the former, without any need to prove that 
each operation during which acts were committed in breach of international law was carried out under 
instructions or effective control.  
In its Commentary, the ILC did not specify the level of control required for attribution, but quoted the 
Tadić decision indicating that “it is a matter for appreciation in each case whether particular conduct was 
or was not carried out under the control of a State, to such an extent that conduct controlled should be 
attributed to it”75 and that the “full factual circumstances and particular context” need to be assessed.76 
Despite the absence of a clear threshold, the principle is that private entities can act on behalf of a State 
as an “extended arm”. As such, a flexible and fact-based view of what falls within a State’s control is 
                                                          
71 Id. 
See also ICJ, Bosnian Genocide case, 2007, cit. note 65. 
72 This level of control is to be contrasted with overall control, which is generic, flows from a general mandate and 
is based on a legal relationship. 
73 K. BOON, Are Control Tests Fit for the Future? The Slippage Problem in Attribution Doctrines, in Melbourne Journal of 
International Law, 2014, p. 329. 
74 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić (Appeal Judgement), Judgment of 15 July 1999, IT-94-1-A. 
75 ILC, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 2001, cit. note 41, p. 48.  
76 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with Commentaries, 
Supplement No. 10 (A/66/10), Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Two, Ch. V(E), p. 
88. 
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required.77 Then the control criterion under Article 8 could be applied, in abstract, to evaluate the State 
responsibility for actions perpetrated by non-State entities on a case-by-case basis. 
However, the jurisdiction of the ICTY relates to personal criminal responsibility and does not extend to 
questions of State responsibility, and thus it does not fall under its competence to rule on that. Moreover, 
the ICJ never supported the overall control test, and in the two subsequent decisions on the Armed 
Activities case of 2005 and the Bosnian Genocide case of 2007, the ICJ reaffirmed the effective control test. 
Therefore, it cannot be stressed that the doctrine of overall control has risen to the rank of international 
customary law already. Moreover, in the case de quo it would be difficult to hold in a Court that a 
responsibility may arise under Article 8 on the EU and its MS for the acts of Libyan groups, since the 
link between the two is not direct but it is mediated by the Libyan government. For this reason, bearing 
in mind the not-binding standards developed on the overall control requirement, accountability for 
European States must be tracked in other norms of international law.  
In this context, Article 16 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility becomes relevant, whichreads as follows: 
“A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of  an internationally wrongful act by the 
latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a) That State does so with knowledge of  the 
circumstances of  the internationally wrongful act; and (b) The act would be internationally wrongful if  
committed by that State”. The Commentary of  the ILC on Article 16 clarifies that aid or assistance in 
the commission of a wrongful act occur when “a State voluntarily assists or aids another State in carrying 
out conduct which violates the international obligations of  the latter, for example, by knowingly 
providing an essential facility or financing the activity in question”.78 The mere funding of  actions can 
thus entail responsibility, provided that the two sub-conditions (a) and (b) are fulfilled.  
In this respect, some authors argue that the massive human right violations by Libyan authorities and 
militias are at least facilitated by the financing and delivering of material and help from the EU States and 
therefore the EU’s and its MS’ migration management policies in support to Libya amount to “assistance” 
in the commitment of  wrongful acts under the international law of  State responsibility.79 According to 
                                                          
77 J. CRAWFORD, State Responsibility, 2013, cit. note 50, p. 141. 
78 ILC, Commentary of the International Law Commission on the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, p. 66. 
79 R. MACKENZIE-GRAY SCOTT, Torture in Libya and Questions of EU Member State Complicity, in EJIL: Talk!, 11 
January 2018; B. FRELICK - I. M. KYSEL - J. PODKUL, The Impact of Externalization of Migration Controls on the 
Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other Migrants, 2016, cit. note 30, p. 197; A. SKORDAS, A ‘blind spot’ in the migration 
debate?, 2018, cit. note 41; N. FREI, Circumventing Non-Refoulement or Fighting “Illegal Migration”?, in EU Immigration 
and Asylum Law and Policy, 15 June 2018, p. 4 (available at www.eumigrationlawblog.eu/circumventing-non-
refoulement-or-fighting-illegal-migration/, accessed on 13 November 2018). 
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this view, there is substantial evidence for the EU’s and its MS’s responsibility in the Libyan events, since 
there is a sufficient nexus between this “aid or assistance” of EU States, and its contribution to the acts 
of torture in Libya,80 and the three conditions of  Article 16 (assistance; knowledge; violation of  an 
international obligation of  the assisting State) are fulfilled.  
This view is partially supported by the findings of the OHCHR, whereas it noted that the new Italian 
government has implemented measures that, according to statistics and fact-findings, “have contributed 
to the increased death rate of migrants and refugees at sea and impacted the life-saving work of defenders 
of the human rights of migrants and refugees”.81 Examples of these measures are the legal and practical 
restrictions of lifesaving search and rescue activities of humanitarian NGOs, including spreading false 
accusations of collusion with smugglers and prohibiting rescue ships from docking in Italian ports. The 
result is a vertiginous increase in the number of migrants pushed back to and detained in Libya and the 
consequent surge of human rights abuses and crimes. Moreover, the UN Special Rapporteur on torture, 
specifically addressing the issue of Libya, stressed that “when "pullbacks" forcibly retain migrants in 
situations where they are exposed to a real risk of torture and illtreatment, any participation, 
encouragement, or assistance provided by destination States for such operations would be irreconcilable 
with a good faith interpretation and performance of the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, including 
the principle of non-refoulement”.82 
However, according tothe ILC Commentary and international law, State responsibility can only be 
established if  the requirement of  the “knowledge of  the circumstances” satisfies two cumulative 
conditions: 1) the assisting State knows the facts linked to the commitment of  the wrongful act; and 2) 
the assisting State acts with a view to facilitate the commission of  the wrongful act (mental element of  a 
specific purpose or dolus specialis).83 This strict interpretation has been confirmed by the ICJ, which 
followed a restrictive meaning of  “intent” in Article 16 of  the Draft Articles in the Genocide case of  2007. 
The Court, equating the content of  Article 16 to the concept of  “complicity”, stressed that “the conduct 
of  … a person furnishing aid or assistance to a perpetrator of  the crime [of  genocide] cannot be treated 
as complicity [in genocide] unless at the least that organ or person acted knowingly, that is to say, in 
                                                          
80 Amnesty International, Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion, 2017, cit. note 43, pp. 42-50. 
81 OHCHR, Desperate and Dangerous, 2018, p. 17. 
82 Human Rights Council, Thirty-seventh session, Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, A/HRC/37/50, 26 February 2018, paras 56-59. 
83 “A State is not responsible for aid or assistance under article 16 unless the relevant State organ intended, by the 
aid or assistance given, to facilitate the occurrence of the wrongful conduct and the internationally wrongful 
conduct is actually committed by the aided or assisted State”. 
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particular, was aware of  the specific intent (dolus specialis) of  the principal perpetrator”.84 If  these strict 
conditions are applied, it is difficult to maintain European States’ responsibility. If  it is undeniable that 
the MS know and cannot ignore the perpetration of  gross human right violations by Libyan authorities 
and groups, it is hardly proved that their cooperation is specifically aimed at facilitating such 
infringements.  
Nevertheless, Article 41 of  the ILC Articles on State Responsibility stresses that “No State shall recognize 
as lawful a situation created by a serious breach [of  an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of  
general international law]… nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation”, introducing a 
direct prohibition to cooperate at any title to serious violations of  jus cogens. A breach of  jus cogens is 
“serious” if  it involves a gross and systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfill its obligations 
under peremptory norms of  international law,85 and, as said, it can consist of  an action or an omission. 
The scope of  this Article is then broader than the applicability of  Article 16 and it is more relevant to 
the current EU-Libya situation. Particularly, it has already been noted that the actions perpetrated by 
Libya amount of  grave and widespread violations of  well-established norms of  jus cogens such as the 
prohibitions of  torture and of  arbitrary detention, the right to seek asylum and the principle of  non-
refoulement.  
This prohibition to cooperation under international law is further strengthened the UN’s “global human 
rights due diligence policy”, aiming at “ensuring that the UN system does not provide any support to 
non-UN security forces where there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of the 
receiving entities committing grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law, 
and that its support contributes to strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights”.86 Although 
soft-law norms with no-binding nature, these due diligence guidelines are a clear evidence of the trend 
toward growing usus and opinio juris in matter of responsibility for indirect involvement in human rights 
abuses.  
                                                          
84 ICJ, Bosnian Genocide case, 2007, cit. note 65, para. 421.  
It can be argued this reasoning applies only to those crimes and violations of IHRL and IHL where the specific 
intent is a constitutive element of the crime. And in fact, the Court, once established the lack of the dolus specialis 
required for genocide, deliberately refrained from ascertain whether in general complicity presupposes that the 
accomplice shares the specific intent of the principal perpetrator.  
85 Article 40 of the ILC Draft Articles, cit. note 41. 
86 UNGA, Sixty-seventh session, and UNSC, Sixty-eighth year, Identical letters dated 25 February 2013 from the Secretary-
General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and to the President of the Security Council, A/67/775–S/2013/110, 
5 March 2013.  
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It is evident that the system of norms listed above, and in particular Article 41 of the ILC Articles on 
State Responsibility, may be invoked to prove the responsibility of European States for their involvement 
in the Libyan events. Of course, the problem with State responsibility is that it falls under the jurisdiction 
of the ICJ, and individuals do not have locus standi before the Court. It is therefore highly unlikely that a 
State, after proving to have a direct interest, will refer to the ICJ another State from the EU for these 
actions. Moreover, the competence of the ICJ does not extend to human rights violations, and as a 
consequence, protection must be sought under a different jurisdictional system.  
Nevertheless, in its recommendations concerning Libya of December 2018, the UN OHCHR required 
the European Union to ensure respect of human rights law wherever “European Union Member States 
exercise jurisdiction or effective control, including extraterritorially”.87 This is an undisputed step 
toward recognition of external responsibility and extraterritorial jurisdiction of the EU in Libya. The 
OHCHR also indicated that “Any future support should be contingent upon the Libyan authorities 
showing progress in upholding human rights law and standards”.88 Failure to comply with this 
recommendation could entail liability of  the MS under the UN system.  
Importantly, voices have been raised also by the civil society, that claims accountability for the clear 
complicity of the EU in this outrage to humanity. In the words of Human Rights Watch: 
EU institutions are aware of the mistreatment and inhumane detention conditions in Libya 
for those intercepted. Indeed, the EU provides support intended to ameliorate these 
conditions in detention. However, even though that support has had minimal impact on 
the situation, the EU continues to pursue a flawed strategy to empower Libyan Coast 
Guards to intercept migrants and asylum seekers and take them back to Libya. Where the 
EU, Italy and other governments have knowingly contributed significantly to the abuses of 
detainees, they have been complicit in those abuses.89 
 
5.3. Profiles of responsibility under the ECHR system 
The mentioned norms under international law and the growth of an opinio juris on external State 
responsibility can be used as parameters to develop and apply analogous standards within the European 
regional human rights system. 
                                                          
87 OHCHR, Desperate and Dangerous, 2018, p. 59. 
88 OHCHR, Desperate and Dangerous, 2018, p. 7. 
89 Human Rights Watch, No Escape from Hell. EU Policies Contribute to Abuse of Migrants in Libya, 21 January 2019.  
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As already mentioned, some authors convincingly hold that the financing and the assistance from the EU 
States contribute or at least facilitate the massive human right violations by Libyan authorities and militias, 
thus the prohibitions of refoulement, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment and arbitrary detention 
incumbent on EU and its MS as part of the ECHR, are violated.90 If European MS cannot be held 
responsible directly for actions perpetrated by Libyan actors in violation of their duties under ECHR, 
they can nevertheless incur in legal responsibility for their failure to prevent of such breaches.  
We have already examined the major human rights instruments providing for the extraterritorial 
application of the human rights standards under a wide conception of jurisdiction. In the European 
system, this broad interpretation of jurisdiction relies firstly on Article 1 of the ECHR, which imposes a 
positive obligation upon States to grant everyone under their jurisdiction with respect for the human 
rights contained in the Convention.91 This wording finds a confirmation in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence,92 
which recognises States accountable for the effects of any act carried out within their jurisdiction, even 
if they take place outside their territory.93 In particular, the Court specified in various decisions relating 
to asylum seekers that the EU’s legal responsibility does not stop at the EU’s physical borders, and that 
MS must bear their own responsibilities towards asylum seekers contracted under the ECHR and the 
other relevant human rights instruments even if they try to outsource their obligations.94 Moreover, the 
threshold of “control” adopted by the Court is significantly lower than “effective control”, and a State 
can be held responsible for actions of armed groups (or other actors) in an external territory, if the State 
has provided financing and material support to such group, even if the State itself does not have the 
intent nor is fully aware of the human rights violations.95  
                                                          
90 N. FREI, Circumventing Non-Refoulement or Fighting “Illegal Migration”?, 2018, cit. note 77, p. 4; M. G. GIUFFRE, 
From Turkey to Libya, 2017, cit. note 39; A. SKORDAS, A ‘Blind Spot’ in the Migration Debate?, 2018, cit. note 41; M. 
JACKSON, Freeing Soering: The ECHR, State Complicity in Torture and Jurisdiction, in European Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 27, Issue 3, 1 August 2016, pp. 817–830; B. FRELICK - I. M. KYSEL - J. PODKUL, The Impact of 
Externalization of Migration Controls on the Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other Migrants, 2016, cit. note 30, pp. 197-199.  
91 ECHR, Article 1: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined 
in Section I of this Convention”. 
92 E.g. ECtHR, Ocalan v. Turkey, Application no. 462211/99, Judgment of 12 March 2003; ECtHR, Issa v. Turkey, 
Application no. 31821/96, Judgment of 16 November 2004; ECtHR, Amuur v. France, Application no. 
17/1995/523/609, Judgment of 25 June 1996; ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey, Application no. 15318/89, Judgment of 
18 December 1996. 
93 B. VANDVIK, Extraterritorial Border Controls and Responsibility To Protect, 2008, cit. note 54. 
94 D. NAKACHE - J. LOSIER, The European Union Immigration Agreement with Libya: Out of Sight, Out of Mind?, in E-
International Relations, 25 July 2017. 
95 For example, see the case ECtHR, Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, Application nos. 43370/04, 8252/05, 
and 18454/06, Judgement of 19 October 2012. 
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The principle of  non-refoulement prohibiting the expulsion or a return of  a person to a State in which 
the fundamental human rights are threatened following from Article 33 of  the 1951 Refugee Convention 
has been interpreted by the Court in the light of  a very broad notion of  the States’ duties under Article 
3 of  the ECHR and entails responsibility for European States also when they fail to prevent violations 
committed by third countries to happen.96 In the paramount Hirsi Jamaa case the Court maintained that 
Libya itself  could not be considered a “place of  safety” because of  the well-documented inadequacy of  
its response to flows of  migrants and asylum seekers: “problems with managing migratory flows cannot 
justify recourse to practices which are not compatible with the State’s obligations… Therefore, any action 
‘the effect of  which is to prevent migrants from reaching the borders of  the [would-be host] State’ may 
amount to refoulement if  there is a foreseeable ‘real risk’ of  ill-treatment in the countries where migrants and 
refugees are trapped”.97 
The procedural dimension of the ban of refoulement, strengthened by the ECtHR in the N.D. and N.T. 
v. Spain decision of October 3rd 2017,98 also suggests that the measures taken in cooperation with third 
countries would be lawful only when compliant with the human rights standards enshrined in the 1951 
Convention and other instruments of international, European and national law.99 Similarly, as already 
mentioned, the European Working Group on Arbitrary Detention specified that prohibition of arbitrary 
detention extends both to the territorial jurisdiction and to the territories under the effective control of 
a State. In its words, the standards settled out “apply to migration detention facilities maintained by a 
State in the territory of another State, with both States jointly responsible for the detention”.100 Finally, 
the already reminded Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, includes an obligation to actively prevent torture in all cases (universal jurisdiction).  
In conclusion, as it has convincingly been said, there is material support in the principles embedded in 
the ECHR and the ECtHR case-law for a broad interpretation on the concept of “jurisdiction” contained 
in Article 1 ECHR so that States are prohibited from facilitating acts of torture both at home and abroad 
(“extraterritorial State complicity”); in other words, a new principle is arising under the ECtHR 
                                                          
96 ECtHR, Soering v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 14038/88, Judgment of 7 July 1989; ECtHR, Othman (Abu 
Qatada) v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 8139/09, Judgment of 17 January 2012. 
97 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa et al. v. Italy, 2012, cit. note 34, paras. 179-180. 
98 ECtHR, N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, Application Nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15, Judgments of 3 October 2017. 
99 “Every person was registered, protected from refoulement and had access to a procedure including a full 
examination of international protection needs and to the respective rights enshrined in the 1951 Convention and 
other instruments of international, European and national law” (N. FREI, Circumventing Non-Refoulement or Fighting 
“Illegal Migration”?, 2018, cit. note 77, p. 6). 
100 Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Revised Deliberation No. 5, 2018, cit. note 5, para. 48. 
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jurisprudence as to which States have a complementary positive obligation to prevent together with a 
negative obligation to refrain from commission of gross human right violations (“preventive complicity 
rule”).101 As a result, by signing migration control agreements with third countries and actively engaging 
in those actions, European States may trigger indirect responsibility before the ECtHR. The auspicious 
is that States will recognise their responsibility to protect and to ensure respect for human rights, and will 
undertake all the necessary measures in order to ensure that their cooperation partners are compliant 
with the fundamental norms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
101 M. JACKSON, Freeing Soering, 2016, cit. note 82. 
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